Limitation under the Hague-Visby Rules

Article IV r.5(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules provides as follows:

“Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of 667.67 units of account per package or 2 units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.”

The issue

The issue was whether the words “goods lost or damaged” refer only to physically lost or damaged goods or whether this also could refer to cargo subject to economic damage.

Previous judgment on the issue

In a previous case – The LIMNOS² – not more than 250 MT of cargo was physically damaged but the entire cargo was distressed. It was held that the words “goods lost or damaged” refers to two categories of goods, namely: (1) goods that are lost in the sense of being missing or destroyed and (2) goods that are damaged in the sense of not being lost, but surviving in damaged form. This did not refer to economic damage. Limitation under Article IV r.5(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules was thus calculated only by reference to the small quantity of damaged cargo despite the fact that the value of the entire cargo was affected.
In the course of that case reference was made to the anomaly that if there was no cargo at all that was physically lost or damaged then the limitation provisions did not apply and the carrier’s exposure was in those circumstances unlimited.

Facts in the THORCO LINEAGE

The claimant was at all material times the owner of a bulk cargo of zinc calcine with a gross weight of 10,287.07 WMT which was loaded on board the vessel THORCO LINEAGE for carriage from Baltimore, USA to Hobart, Australia. On 21 June 2018, whilst on passage across the Pacific Ocean, the vessel lost power as a result of an engine failure. On 23 June 2018 she grounded on Raroia Atoll in French Polynesia. As a result of the grounding she suffered extensive damage with ballast tanks being punctured, the rudder lost and the propeller damaged beyond repair.

The vessel was the subject of salvage operations and eventually towed to South Korea for repairs. The cargo was discharged and some forwarded to destination.

It was understood that of the total cargo only 764.07 WMT were lost or physically damaged with the remaining 9,523 WMT undamaged.

The costs arising out of the grounding included (a) salvage and (b) cost of onward shipment of sound cargo. Such cost did not relate merely to the cargo that was lost or damaged.

Was limitation to be calculated only by reference to the 764 WMT physically lost or damage or the entire cargo?

Held

The THORCO LINEAGE did not follow the earlier decision in the Limnos. It was held that the meaning of “lost or damaged goods” in Article IV r.5(a) of the Hague Visby Rules could include goods which have been economically damaged.

In the judgment it was stated:

“The merchant will expect to have his goods delivered to him at the discharge port pursuant to the contract of carriage contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading in the same good order and condition as they were in when shipped on board. If they are not so delivered they will be regarded as damaged. There is, I think, no dispute as to that. But… casualties can occur at sea which imperil both ship and cargo as a result of which the goods can only be delivered at the discharge port in sound condition as a result of additional and unexpected expense being incurred by the merchant. This case is an example of two … expenses, salvage payable pursuant to LOF and the cost of on-shipping goods from a place of safety to the port of discharge. In such cases the goods, though in sound condition, will have for the merchant a diminished value at the port of discharge to the extent of the additional expense which he has incurred. In such cases it can fairly be said, and I have no doubt would be said by the merchant, that the goods have suffered economic damage as a result of the casualty at sea. The cargo is as much the victim of the casualty as it is where physical damage is caused.… I therefore think that when one has regard to the context of the carriage of goods by sea there is a cogent argument that the ordinary meaning of “lost or damaged goods” in Article IV r.5(a) of the Hague Visby Rules can include goods which have been economically damaged.”

It was observed in passing that Article IV r.5(a) could not have been intended to prevent there being a limitation by requiring the presence of physical damage to the goods.

The court also upheld an alternative argument that the cargo in this case was physically damaged in that it was subject to the salvor’s maritime lien and so the claimant’s proprietary or possessory title to the cargo was damaged.

In conclusion it was held the limit of the defendant’s liability in respect of the claimant’s liability to pay salvage and the on-shipment costs was based upon 2 SDRs per kilogramme of the entire cargo.

¹ Trafigura PTE Ltd v TKK Shipping Ltd (“The Thorco Lineage”) [2023] EWHC 26 (Comm)

² Serena Navigation v Dera Commercial Establishment (“The Limnos”)[2008] 2 Lloyd’s Reports 166

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So what is the back story?

Good faith – no general principle applicable to contracts

Firstly it is, and continues to be, well understood that in contrast to some other legal systems there is no general obligation of good faith under the English law of contract. In the words of a recent judgment of the UK Supreme Court

But, in contrast to many civil law jurisdictions and some common law jurisdictions, English law has never recognised a general principle of good faith in contracting. Instead, English law has relied on piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness²:

Good faith as an implied contract term

When will good faith obligations arise in connection with a contract? Aside from cases where good faith is an express term of a contract the question is whether such an obligation is to be implied as a term of a contract. 

There are two types of contractual implied term. The first is a term to be implied into a particular contract in the light of the express terms, commercial common sense, and the factual circumstances known or reasonably available to the parties at the time the contract was made. The second type arises where the law, sometimes by statute sometimes through common law, effectively imposes terms into certain types of relationships unless such a term is expressly excluded³. 

In the latter case a duty of good faith is implied by law in certain categories of contract such as contracts of employment, contracts of insurance or partnership agreements. However as a consequence of the decision in Yam Seng Pte v International Trade Corp [2013] EWHC 111(QB) it s now possible to claim that a good faith obligation may be implied in so called “relational” contracts. Such relational contracts:

“…may require a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties’ understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements.”⁴

This has led to the avalanche of cases referred to earlier where claimants have attempted to show their contract was “relational” in order to establish an implied good faith obligation.

What are the characteristic of a “relational contract”?

The following, non exhaustive, characteristics of a relational contract⁵ were approved in the Court of Appeal judgment in Candey “merely as a sense check rather than a series of statutory requirements“:

1. There must be no specific express terms in the contract that prevents a duty of good faith being implied into the contract.
2. The contract will be a long-term one, with the mutual intention of the parties being that there will be a long-term relationship.
3. The parties must intend that their respective roles be performed with integrity, and with fidelity to their bargain.
4. The parties will be committed to collaborating with one another in the performance of the contract.
5. The spirits and objectives of their venture may not be capable of being expressed exhaustively in a written contract.
6. They will each repose trust and confidence in one another, but of a different kind to that involved in fiduciary relationships.
7. The contract in question will involve a high degree of communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence, and expectations of loyalty.
8. There may be a degree of significant investment by one party (or both) in the venture. This significant investment may be, in some cases, more accurately described as substantial financial commitment.

The Court of Appeal judgment in Candey v Bosheh

Candey were a firm of solicitors. They agreed to act for Bosheh in litigation on the basis of a conditional fee agreement (“CFA”). Under the terms of that agreement Bosheh would pay Candey a fee if there was a recovery but nothing if they lost the case. In the event Bosheh settled their dispute on a “drop hands” basis and there was thus no recovery and no fees payable to Candey.

Candey brought proceedings against their now former client Bosheh on the basis that the CFA was a relational contract and that client was in breach of a duty of good faith, by settling the underlying litigation on terms which meant that Candey had no express entitlement to their fees.

The judge at first instance rejected the argument that the client Bosheh owed their lawyers a duty of good faith observing that there was no authority to support the argument that a client owes his solicitor a duty of good faith and the solicitor’s fiduciary duty to the client would displace such a finding.

The Court of Appeal considered the matter first by reference to the usual test for implied terms, and then by asking whether this was a relational contract.

They did not accept that the normal rules for implication of terms into contract would here imply a good faith obligation into the CFA. Such an obligation was not so obvious that it went with saying and it was not necessary to make the CFA contract work.

Separately the court did not accept that the CFA was a “relational” contract having regard to the characteristics listed above and rejected the argument that a good faith obligation would thereby be implied by law. They concluded:

In short, this was an ordinary solicitors’ retainer which happened to be on a CFA basis. There are thousands of those in operation at any one time in the UK. Nobody has ever suggested before that they are relational contracts, or that in every CFA, the client owed the solicitor a duty of good faith.

Conclusions

The Court of Appeal finding on this case is not in itself surprising. That a client might owe a duty of good faith to his lawyer was described as a startling concept. However some of the comments are of interest because they seem to suggest that we have reached a high water mark where good faith allegations are concerned. Whilst the concept of good faith being implied into relational contracts remains intact it looks as if it may in the future be more difficult to successfully argue for its application. In referring to the prior avalanche of claims based to alleged relational contracts the court added cryptically, “Only a relatively few have succeeded“, which may be an indication as to how they viewed the situation.

The pointers suggest that the future trend may be away from allegations that a contract is “relational “ and back towards consideration of whether under the normal rules a good faith term is to be implied in any given contract. In the words of the court:

“Putting (it) another way, it might be said that the elusive concept of good faith should not be used to avoid orthodox and clear principles of English contract law.”

Note the reference to “the elusive concept of good faith” which appears to accept that it may arise but leaves open just what this might amount to in any give context.

A further point – Fiduciary relationships distinguished from good faith obligations

The court confirmed that the CFA was a fiduciary relationship, with Candey owing a fiduciary duty, or an obligation of “loyal subordination” of its own interests to those of the Boshehs and that such a duty was different to the trust and confidence of a good faith obligation in a relational contract. There is nothing new here as this merely reaffirms the existing law. However it is worth drawing attention to this fundamental difference.

[1] Candey ltd v Bosheh [2022] EWCA civ 1103

[2] Affirming the earlier decision in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433 at 439 

[3] Europa Plus SCA SIF & Ors v Anthracite Investments (Ireland) Plc [2016] EWHC 437 (Comm) at paragraph 33

[4] Yam Seng Pte v International Trade Corp [2013] EWHC 111(QB)

[5] Bates v Post Office [2019] EWHC 606

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” Owing to the outbreak of hostilities it is now quite evident that the delivery of the machines on order … cannot take place. Under the circumstances we shall be obliged if you will kindly arrange to return our initial payment … at your early convenience.”

So wrote the agents of the Eastern European buyers of machinery to the UK based sellers some seven days after the buyers’ country had been invaded.

The sellers refused. This was not the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 but the German invasion of Poland in 1939. Nothing changes. In that event further performance of the contract was impossible due to the war and question was whether the Polish buyers could recover the earlier payment (eventually held that they could)[1].

The invasion of Ukraine is likely to directly or indirectly impact on the performance of many contracts. War, whether declared or not, may directly or indirectly prevent contractual performance. There may also be a ripple effect with sanctions, legal obstacles, cyber attacks and market issues that flow out from hostilities that may impact on contract performance.

What is the legal situation in such circumstances, where does risk lie and what remedies might be available? In this article we look briefly at the legal landscape and legal routes that might apply where the performance of contracts subject to English law is prevented by circumstances flowing out of hostilities.

Two routes – operation of law or application of contract terms

Where issues arise that affect performance of a contract the parties’ obligations may be governed either by operation of law or under the terms of the applicable contract. We consider each of these below.

Operation of law – Frustration of contract

Does the law operate to relieve or suspend contractual obligations if circumstances make performance impossible or economically unviable? English law has historically required parties to perform their contractual obligations but where unforeseen circumstances arise to render performance of impossible it may be considered “frustrated”.

The result is that the contract is considered as being at an end and the parties discharged from any further performance obligations. In the words of one judge[2]:

“Frustration of a contract takes place when there supervenes an event (without default of either party and for which the contract makes no sufficient provision) which so significantly changes the nature (not merely the expense or onerousness) of the outstanding contractual rights and/or obligations from what the parties could reasonably have contemplated at the time of its execution that it would be unjust to hold them to the literal sense of its stipulations in the new circumstances; in such case the law declares both parties to be discharged from further performance.“

This doctrine has its origin in the case of Taylor v Caldwell[3]. The parties contracted for the use of a music hall but the hall burnt down before it could be used thus rendering the contemplated performance of the contract impossible. The contract was held to be frustrated and the parties discharged from further obligations.

Examples of circumstances giving rise to frustration in the past include destruction of the subject matter and supervening illegality[4]. The case of the Polish buyers[5] referred to at the beginning of this article was another example of frustration.

Frustration is limited in its application. Thus:

1. Frustration does not arise merely if changed circumstances make a contract more onerous to perform[6].
   In the words of one judge[7]: “The appellants were undoubtedly put to considerable expense and inconvenience. But that is not enough”.

2. Frustration does not apply on a temporary basis to merely suspend a contract. If frustration applies then it ends the contract permanently. This may be contrasted with the effect of Force Majeure clauses considered below where a contract may continue whilst the obligation to perform is suspended or qualified.

Frustration thus may not be applicable in many cases where the impact of hostilities on contractual performance falls short of rendering it impossible.

Where a contract is frustrated the rather prosaically named Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 establishes a statutory framework to deal with payments made and work done prior to frustration. Charter parties and contracts of insurance are excluded from this Act.

Other than in the limited cases when a contract is frustrated English law is not generous in providing legal solutions to events impacting on contract performance. English law (unlike some other legal systems) does not recognise Force Majeure as a legal concept and this term has no technical legal meaning. It is relevant only in the context of contractual provisions referred to later.

Likewise English law does not assist where there is a material change of circumstances that adversely affect the parties if the contract is still possible to perform and not considered frustrated.

Contract clauses where performance is affected by hostilities

The occasions when a contract is considered frustrated may be limited. Outside frustration what of the contract terms? Contract terms will, of course, vary considerably and reference to the name used for any particular type of clause may not be helpful. Much will depend on the wording and its construction. However some broad areas of coverage may be identified:

1. clauses suspending or qualifying present obligations going forward.
2. clauses excluding liabilities arising out of past performance.
3. clauses concerned with the effect of an event upon a contract for the future.
4. clauses giving a right of termination.

Clauses suspending or qualifying obligations – Force Majeure

It is common for commercial contracts to include a clause suspending or qualifying the parties’ present obligations if certain “Force Majeure” events arise. As mentioned previously force majeure as such is not a legal concept recognised under English law but the name if commonly used for such contract terms.

This type of clause intended to address the parties’ further obligations on the arising of certain events. The contract is thus usually considered as (at least initially) continuing with the clause merely modifying or suspending obligations.

A typical force majeure clause (a) lists a number of event or causes beyond the control of the parties (“Force Majeure” events), (b) defines the effect such events much at have to apply and (c) the consequences on the parties obligation if that occurs.

“Force Majeure” events listed tend to divide into (a) natural disasters and (b) man made events that include war and “restraint of princes” or act of government. Hitherto cyber attacks do not seem to feature as express events listed in typical wording.

One important point is that unless otherwise stated in the wording a change in economic circumstances will not alone be considered as a Force Majeure event. As stated in one case[8] it is:

“well established under English law that a change in economic/market circumstances, affecting the profitability of a contract or the ease with which the parties’ obligations can be performed is not regarded as being a force majeure event“

And again[9]

” … It does not at all follow that the supplier is entitled to rely upon an increase in the market price in comparison to the contract price as a force majeure circumstance. ……… This conclusion is consistent with a line of cases, both on force majeure clauses and on frustration, ….., to the effect that the fact that a contract has become expensive to perform, even dramatically more expensive, is not a ground to relieve a party on the grounds of force majeure or frustration.“

Force Majeure clauses typically require an affected party to give notice to the other contract party for the clause to be activated.

Clauses excluding liabilities arising out of past performance – Exceptions clauses

Exceptions clauses exclude or limit liability for specified past breaches of contract at a time when the contract remained in existence and was the source of contractual obligations. As such they are different from Force Majeure clauses that cover present performance.

Clauses concerned with the effect of an event upon the future of the contract

Another type of clause is one that expressly addresses the effect of frustrating events on future performance and operates to end the contract and the obligations of the parties.

Termination clauses

Most commercial agreements include a clause giving a right to terminate triggered by certain named events. Such termination clauses may include a right to terminate in the event of war or other hostilities as defined. Such provisions may merely trigger a right that has to be exercised rather than a termination that arises automatically if an event occurs. Such events may include the continuation of a force majeure event for more than a stated period thus linking this to any force majeure provisions as referred to above.

Ready willing and able to perform – a precondition?

One further question for consideration is whether any contractual  provisions that excuse a party from performance are subject to a precondition that the party concerned was otherwise ready willing and able to perform its obligations. This has been called the “but for” test i.e. whether it was necessary for a party to prove that, but for the force majeure or frustrating event, it could and would have performed the contract in accordance with its terms. Whether this applies in any given case will depend on the wording of the clause concerned. It is, however, a point that may invite consideration.

Where contract terms are concerned there is no one answer. These comments are merely indicative of the ground that may be covered by any contract terms. As mentioned previously much depends on the precise contract wording.

Sources

[1] Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1942] UKHL 4

[2] Lord Simon  in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675

[3] [1863] EWHC QB

[4] Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser & Co Ltd [1944] AC 265 where regulations passed in connection with the war made performance illegal.

[5] Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1942] UKHL 4

[6] Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] UKHL 3

[7] National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675

[8] Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd v Aero Toy Store [2010] 

[9] Thames Valley Power Ltd. v. Total Gas & Power Ltd. [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 441

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No universally applicable duty of good faith in commercial contracts

The judgment confirmed that under English law there is no general duty of good faith in all commercial contracts.  However such a duty would be implied into contracts that were considered “relational”.

Relational contracts

A “relational” contract has been described as contract that involves a high degree of communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and expectations of loyalty “which are not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties’ understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements”.

Whether any contract is relational is heavily dependent upon context, as well as the terms. The circumstances of the relationship, defined by the terms of the agreement, set in its commercial context, is what decides whether a contract is relational or not.

The court considered[2] that the following characteristics are relevant as to whether a contract is a relational one giving rise to an implied duty of good faith or not:

1. There must be no specific express terms in the contract that prevents a duty of good faith being implied into the contract.
2. The contract will be a long-term one, with the mutual intention of the parties being that there will be a long-term relationship.
3. The parties must intend that their respective roles be performed with integrity, and with fidelity to their bargain.
4. The parties will be committed to collaborating with one another in the performance of the contract.
5. The spirits and objectives of their venture may not be capable of being expressed exhaustively in a written contract.
6. They will each repose trust and confidence in one another, but of a different kind to that involved in fiduciary relationships.
7. The contract in question will involve a high degree of communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence, and expectations of loyalty.
8. There may be a degree of significant investment by one party (or both) in the venture. This significant investment may be, in some cases, more accurately described as substantial financial commitment.
9. Exclusivity of the relationship may also be present.

This was not considered as an exhaustive list. No single one of the above list was determinative, with the exception of the first one (express terms). If the express terms prevent the implication of a duty of good faith, then that will be the end of the matter.

The court noted that an imbalance of power between the parties was not a factor that had any effect of whether a contract was a relational one.

What is a duty of good faith?

The judge stated that where duty of good faith is implied in a contract,

“This means that both the parties must refrain from conduct which in the relevant context would be regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people. Transparency, co-operation, and trust and confidence are, in my judgment, implicit within the implied obligation of good faith.”

A duty of good faith is more than a duty to act honestly or, alternatively, not to act dishonestly[3].

Also it is more than an implied term merely not to do anything to frustrate the purpose of the contract.

Duty of good faith to be distinguished from a fiduciary duty

The judgment confirmed that obligation to act in good faith is not the same a fiduciary duty quoting the following from an earlier judgment[4].

“… ‘relational’ contracts involve trust and confidence but of a different kind from that involved in fiduciary relationships. The trust is not in the loyal subordination by one party of its own interests to those of another. It is trust that the other party will act with integrity and in a spirit of cooperation.”

Implied terms

The court upheld the view that there are two types of implied terms[5].

First, there are those terms which are implied into a contract where it is necessary to give business efficacy to the particular contract in question. Second, there are those terms which are implied into a class of contractual relationship e.g. relational contract, unless the parties have expressly excluded it.

If a contract was “relational” then a good faith obligation would be implied and this could give rise to a number of implied obligations. In the particular judgment concerned the court implied seventeen separate provisions that arose out on the good faith obligation  In parallel the court implied other terms were considered necessary on the grounds of business efficacy.

Express terms imposing a duty of good faith

An obligation of good faith will only be implied in the absence of express terms on the subject. Express provisions dealing will good faith may restrict or prevent any implied obligations of good faith.

Comment

The duty of good faith may appear deceptively simple. However if a contract is a relational one then the existence of a duty of good faith may be portal through which many obligations may be implied As mentioned previously in the Bates case no less than seventeen provisions were implied as a consequence of the good faith obligation. The nature of the good faith obligation in the context of any particular relational contract may be a source of dispute in the future.

[1] Bates v Post Office Ltd (no 3) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB)

[2] At para 725

[3] para 711

[4] Sheikh Al Nehayan v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm)

[5] Geys v Société Générale [2013] 1 AC 523

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The facts

The “NEW FLAMENCO” was a small cruise ship built in Genoa in 1972. She was chartered for a term due to end on 28 October 2007.
The Owners and Charterers reached an oral agreement to extend the charter party term for a further two years so as to expire on 2 November 2009. However, the Charterers later disputed having made this agreement. They maintained an entitlement to redeliver the Vessel on 28 October 2007.

The Owners treated the Charterers as being in anticipatory breach and on 17 August 2007 accepted this breach as terminating the charter party. The Vessel was redelivered on 28 October 2007. Shortly before that date, the Owners entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for sale of the Vessel for US$23,765,000.

The Owners advanced a claim for damages calculated by reference to the net loss of profits which they alleged that they would have earned during the additional two-year extension. The amount claimed was €7,558,375.

The issue

The question was whether the Owners were bound to bring into account and give credit for the difference between the amount for which the Vessel had been sold when redelivered in October 2007 (US$23,765,000) and her value when she should have been redelivered in November 2009 (US$7,000,000). If so this amount would extinguish the Owner’s claim.

The Supreme Court decision

The Supreme Court stated:

“On the facts here the fall in value of the vessel was …. irrelevant because the owners’ interest in the capital value of the vessel had nothing to do with the interest injured by the charterers’ repudiation of the charterparty.

…..The essential question is whether there is a sufficiently close link between …(the benefit and the loss caused by the wrongdoer)… and not whether they are similar in nature. The relevant link is causation. The benefit to be brought into account must have been caused either by the breach of the charterparty or by a successful act of mitigation. “

The court observed that there was nothing about the premature termination of the charterparty which made it necessary to sell the vessel, either at all or at any particular time. Indeed, it could have been sold during the term of the charterparty. If the owners decided to sell the vessel, whether before or after termination of the charterparty, they were making a commercial decision at their own risk about the disposal of an interest in the vessel which was no part of the subject matter of the charterparty and had nothing to do with the charterers.

The court also concluded that the sale of the ship was not on the face of it an act of successful mitigation. If there had been an available charter market, the loss would have been the difference between the actual charterparty rate and the assumed substitute contract rate. The sale of the vessel would have been irrelevant. In the absence of an available market, the measure of the loss is the difference between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably to have been earned from employment of the vessel under shorter charterparties, as for example on the spot market. The relevant mitigation in that context was the acquisition of an income stream alternative to the income stream under the original charterparty. The sale of the vessel was not itself an act of mitigation because it was incapable of mitigating the loss of the income stream.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commercial Court that held the owners were not required to give credit for any benefit in realising the capital value of the vessel in October 2007 by reference to its capital value in November 2009.

¹Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel S.A.U. (formerly Travelplan S.A.U) of Spain [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm)
²Globalia Business Travel S.A.U. (formerly TravelPlan S.A.U.) of Spain (Respondent) v Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 43

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